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ABSTRACT 
THE EFFECTS OF BANK CAPITAL ON CREDIT SUPPLY 
IN RESPONSE TO CHANGES IN LEVELS OF LIQUIDITY: 
EVIDENCE FROM US COMMERCIAL BANKS FROM 2003 TO 2010 
By 
Dohan Kim 
 
This paper examines whether the effect of a change of bank capital ratios on 
lending differs depending on the level of liquidity. Using the balanced 1,050 U.S. commercial 
banks quarterly data from 2003 Q1 to 2010 Q4, this paper finds that the effect of bank capital 
on credit growth, where it is defined as a quarterly growth rate of loans and unused 
commitments, relates positively to the level of bank liquid assets. It also shows that the 
positive effect of bank capital increase on credit growth is significant only after banks retain 
enough liquid assets. This interaction effect did not change during the recent financial crisis 
period, and were more prominent for large banks. The results suggest three important policy 
implications. First, any policy actions to sustain bank lending, for example capital injections 
and liquidity support, are complementary and should be implemented harmoniously to be 
more effective. Second, if only capital injection is implemented, this would be more effective 
for banks with high liquid assets in the light of boosting credit supply. At last, international 
regulatory efforts to induce banks to hold more liquid assets and capital would be a right 
direction since banks with more liquid assets and capital would be able to supply more credit 
thanks to their increased capability of absorbing negative economic shocks. 
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I. Introduction 
 
Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke said, “Capital is important to banking 
organizations and the financial system because it acts as a financial cushion to absorb a firm’s 
losses”1.  
After the recent financial crisis, the importance of financial stability of the banking 
systems has been issued to regulators, academics and policymakers. Especially, with the 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) at the center, regulators and policymakers 
have highlighted the importance of sufficient capital buffers and sound liquidity risk 
management for the stability of the banking systems. As a result, Basel III, which requires 
enhanced quality and quantity of capital as well as sufficient amount of stable funding based 
on the liquidity of bank’s assets, has been recently endorsed internationally. The idea is also 
based on the belief that banks holding sufficient capital, liquid assets, and stable funding 
structure would maintain their intermediation capacity better in response to external negative 
economic shocks.  
One of the main objectives of reforms to strengthen global capital and liquidity rules, 
as emphasized by the Basel Committee, is to build the foundation for sustainable economic 
growth with a strong and resilient banking system (BCBS, 2011). That is to say, it is to 
prevent losses caused by spilling over from negative shocks in the financial sector to the real 
economy. In this context, a number of researches have examined the effects of financial 
shocks on real economic activity and the procyclical features of risk-based capital ratios, 
which may worsen financial shocks further by inducing banks to reduce the supply of credit 
when needed the most.   
Above all, however, understanding a relationship between bank capital and lending is a 
                                                                
1 Federal Reserve Board, Press Release June 7, 2012 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/20120607a.htm 
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key to other bank related studies. As Berrospide and Edge (2010) point out, quantifying the 
effect of bank capital on bank credit supply is one of the most fundamental research questions 
to verify the linkage between financial sector and real activity. For example, bank capital 
plays a key role in a framework for the macro-financial linkage developed by Bayoumi and 
Malander (2008). In their framework, a relationship between the bank capital ratio and 
lending standards is the first link. Banks tighten their lending standards in response to a 
negative shock on the capital ratio, causing a decrease in the credit volume. They find that a 
reduction of the bank capital ratio by one percentage point results in 2.5% decrease of change 
in credit to GDP ratio, and finally causes 1.5% reduction in the level of GDP. Furthermore, it 
is also important to understand the ‘bank-capital channel’ of monetary policy. Van den Heuvel 
(2007), Gambacorta and Mistrulli (2004), and Meh (2011) emphasize the importance of the 
bank-capital channel, the channel through which monetary policy and shocks to bank capital 
affect bank lending. Thus, it is hard to comprehend the effect of monetary policy on real 
economy without verifying the relationship between bank capital and lending  
Figure 1 shows that a growth rate of bank lending has dropped significantly during 
2008 and 2010, which is considered the most severe crisis period. A shortage of capital was 
spotted as one of key factors that limit banks’ ability to make loans. For this reason, many 
studies that examine the effect of changes in bank capital on lending have emerged recently. 
(see Berrospide and Edge, 2010; Gambacorta and Marques-Ibanez, 2011; Carlson et al., 
2011; Brei et al., 2013). On the other hand, some papers have focused on other factors that 
caused a slowdown of bank lending during the recent financial crisis. For instance, Corentt et 
al. (2011) and Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010) highlight the effect of bank liquidity on 
lending. Cornett et al. (2011) find that banks’ efforts to manage liquidity caused a decline in 
bank lending during the recent crisis. Similarly, Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010) show that a 
drop in the supply of bank lending was greater for banks with less access to deposit financing 
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and more exposed to credit-line drawdowns. 
The idea of this paper is based on the conclusions of a number of related literatures that 
highlight the importance of other bank-specific characteristics on bank lending (Berrospide 
and Edge, 2010; Gambacorta and Marques-Ibanez, 2011). In fact, researches to date have 
focused on a linear relationship between bank capital ratios and bank lending or examined 
whether there was a structural change in response to external shocks. To my best knowledge, 
there are no studies that examine the interaction effect of bank capital and liquidity on 
lending. In this regard, this paper examines whether the effect of bank capital on lending 
changes depending on the level of bank liquidity using the balanced 1,050 U.S. commercial 
banks quarterly data from 2003 Q1 to 2010 Q4.  
The main results are as follows. The effect of bank capital on credit2, which is defined 
as net loans on the balance sheet plus unused commitments off the balance sheet, relates 
positively to the level of bank liquidity. The results suggest that the effect of bank capital 
increases leads to bank lending increases only after banks retain enough liquid assets. This 
interaction effect did not change during the crisis period, and more prominent for large banks. 
The results suggest three important policy implications. First, any policy actions such as 
capital injections and liquidity support to sustain bank lending are complementary and should 
be implemented harmoniously to be more effective. Second, if only capital injection is 
implemented, this would be more effective for banks with high liquid assets in terms of only 
supporting credit supply. Third, recent international regulatory reform efforts that emphasize 
the importance of sufficient capital and liquidity management are supported. BCBS (2011) 
underlines the importance of liquidity management because banks failing to manage their 
liquidity well have suffered despite of adequate capital levels during the recent financial 
crisis. The results imply that banks with high amount of capital and liquid assets would cut 
                                                                
2  In this paper, the term “credit” is defined as net loans on the balance sheet plus unused commitments off the 
balance sheet while “loan” is defined as net loans. 
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credit supply less in response to external shocks than banks with lack of capital and liquid 
assets although newly imposed liquidity regulation may change banks’ behavior in an 
unexpected way. 
This paper makes two contributions to the literature. First, it shows that the interaction 
effect of bank capital and liquidity on credit supply is significant, which may imply that the 
relationship between bank capital and lending is complicated rather than a linear. Researches 
to date have focused on the linear relationship between bank capital and lending. Second, it 
shows that a role of unused commitments should be considered when analyzing the effect of 
bank capital on lending. The main results of this paper hold only when unused commitments 
are included in the definition of lending, implying that credit, which is defined as net loans on 
the balance sheet plus unused commitments off the balance sheet, is maybe the more 
appropriate measure for bank lending. This view is consistent with Cornett et al. (2011) and 
Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010).  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature. In section 3, our 
hypotheses are discussed. Section 4 briefly describes the data used. Section 5 describes the 
empirical methodology and variables. Section 6 presents regression results and Section 7 
addresses robustness issues. At last, Section 8 concludes and discusses policy implications. 
 
 
II. Literature review 
 
Use of actual capital ratio versus gap between actual and target capital ratio 
There are two strands of the literature that examine the effect of bank capital on 
lending. This is because there is an issue about how to judge whether banks are well-
capitalized. One may look at the actual capital ratio compared to some absolute numbers such 
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as the minimum regulatory requirements, 8%, and 10%, which are the levels viewed as well-
capitalized banks by capital adequacy guidelines (e.g., see Bernanke and Lown, 1990; 
Gambacorta and Mistrulli, 2004; Carlson et al., 2011; Das and Sy, 2012; Brei et al., 2013; 
Kapan and Minoiu, 2013). However, some researchers prefer to use the gap between the 
estimated target capital ratio and the actual capital ratio to evaluate whether banks are well-
capitalized (e.g., see Furlong, 1992; Hancock and Wilcox, 1994; Wall and Peterson, 1995; 
Jacques and Nigro, 1997; Flannery and Rangan, 2008; Maurin and Toivanen, 2012; Francis 
and Osborne, 2012; Shim, 2013: Martín-Oliver et al., 2013).  
Berrospide and Edge (2012) and Carlson et al. (2011) discuss the merits and 
shortcomings of each approach. They argue that one potential problem with the analysis 
using the target capital ratio is that any models used to estimate the target capital ratio can be 
misspecified. If the model is poor, any results of using the estimated target capital ratio are 
easily biased. On the other hand, Carlson et al. (2011) point out that analysis using the target 
capital ratio can explain why some banks adjust lending policies to move toward higher 
capital ratios even if the capital ratios look high enough. 
It is arguable which approach is better to examine the effect of bank capital ratio on 
bank lending. Although there is a general agreement that banks manage their capital ratios 
actively to reach the implicit target capital ratios and many researchers use the concept of the 
bank target capital ratio as one of the determinants of the actual capital ratio, this study uses 
only the actual capital ratio for two reasons. First, I estimated the target capital ratio by using 
a partial adjustment model, which is used in a large number of literature (e.g., see Furlong, 
1992; Hancock and Wilcox, 1994; Flannery and Rangan, 2008; Berrospide and Edge, 2010; 
Maurin and Toivanen, 2012; Francis and Osborne, 2012; Martín-Oliver et al., 2013), but it 
was found that the target capital ratio was too volatile for the low adjustment speed, 10~20 
percent on a quarterly basis. This result increases concerns about the bias of the estimated 
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target capital ratio. Second, the main interest is the relationship between lending and the 
actual capital ratio that is observable rather implicit and unobservable target capital ratio. 
Besides, policies based on observable values are preferred. Therefore, in this study, only 
actual capital ratios are employed. 
The effect of bank capital on lending 
 There have been many empirical studies that examined the effect of bank capital on 
lending, and most of them found positive effects of capital on lending albeit various degrees 
of the effects. In the early literature, Bernanke and Lown (1991) estimate that the effect of 
one percentage increase in bank capital on bank lending is about a 2~3 percentage point 
increase per year in loan growth. Although they conclude that the relationship between bank 
capital and lending is modest in size and the capital shortage is not a major factor in the 
lending slowdown, the estimates are somewhat larger than those of other related studies. 
Berrospide and Edge (2010) explain that larger estimates by Bernanke and Lown (1991) may 
be caused by the fact that their model does not include other bank-specific control variables. 
Thus, the coefficient on the capital ratio captures the effects of other variables. 
 Berrospide and Edge (2010) explore the relationship between bank capital and 
lending in various ways. Using the unbalanced 140 U.S. Bank Holding Companies (BHCs) 
quarterly data from 1992 Q1 to 2008 Q3, they estimate around 0.7~1.2 percentage points 
increase in loan growth in response to one percentage point increase in bank capital ratio, on 
a yearly basis. They also employ the VAR model along with the fixed effect regressions, and 
find relatively modest effects of bank capital on loan growth. Interestingly, they also find that 
the modest effects are stable over time by performing rolling-window panel regressions. 
Nonlinear effects and interaction effects with the output gap are also examined, but they 
report that none of these terms are statistically significant.    
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 Furlong (1992) and Hancock and Wilcox (1994) suggest a positive effect of bank 
capital on lending. Furlong (1992) finds the ratio of the bank capital ratio to the target capital 
ratio is positively associated with bank loan growth. Hancock and Wilcox (1994) estimate 
that each $1 of bank capital shortfall resulted in about $4.50 reduction in bank credit during 
1991 in the U.S.  
 While above mentioned studies use the U.S. data, Gambacorta and Mistrulli (2004) 
and Francis and Osborne (2010) focus on Italian banks and U.K. banks, respectively. Using 
the Italian banks’ quarterly data over the period 1992-2001, Gambacorta and Mistrulli (2004) 
find that the effect of excess capital on lending is significantly positive and the impacts of 
monetary policy and output shocks on bank lending are different based on the level of bank 
capitalization. Francis and Osborne (2012) find that banks raise their target capital ratios 
when capital requirements are increased, and vice versa. Thus, banks increase their actual 
capital ratios in response to tightened capital requirements by adjusting their portfolios 
toward less risky assets to reduce the gap between the internal target capital ratios and the 
actual capital ratios, suggesting that bank lending depends positively on the gap between the 
actual and target ratios. A partial adjustment model is used with quarterly data for U.K. 
individual banks from 1996 to 2007.   
 The effect of capital ratio on loan growth estimated by Carlson et al. (2011) is small 
compared to what the previous literature has found. They find that the effect of a one 
percentage point increase in capital ratio on loan growth is about 0.05~0.2 percentage point 
increase on an annual based on the annual U.S. banks data from 2001 to 2009. However, this 
positive relationship is not found prior to the recent financial crisis and become significant 
only in 2008 and 2009. Thus, they suggest that capital matters more for loan growth during 
the crisis period. The result corresponds to what Gambacorta and Marques-Ibanez (2011) and 
Cornett et al. (2011) have found although it was not the focus of their researches.  
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Other relevant literature 
Since the Basel Committee adopted the international bank regulatory framework, 
called the Basel Accord, in 1988, which sets the minimum capital requirement that banks 
should maintain, many studies that examine the effects of this regulation on bank risk-taking 
behavior, lending, and overall soundness and safety of individual banks as well as the 
banking system have emerged. Specifically, many researchers have examined whether capital 
requirements boost bank capital ratios and restrain bank risk-taking. These studies are closely 
related to the main question of this study. 
VanHoose (2008) surveys previous academic researches in this subject, and concludes 
that there is not strong evidence that toughening capital requirements has contributed 
significantly to an increase of the bank capital ratios. This is consistent with Jackson et al. 
(1999) that explore prior studies over the 1980s and 1990s investigating whether banks 
increase capital ratios in response to regulatory capital requirements. They find that it is hard 
to conclude that capital requirements induce banks to hold higher capital ratios than they 
otherwise would although there is a broad consensus that low capitalized banks tend to 
increase their capital ratios rapidly more than do well capitalized banks. Gropp and Heider 
(2009) also find that capital regulation is only a second-order determinant of banks’ capital 
structure using 200 largest publicly traded banks from 16 countries consisting of the U.S. and 
15 EU countries from 1991 to 2004. 
However, Jacques and Nigro (1997) find that risk-based capital regulation results in an 
increase of capital ratios and a decrease of risk in banks’ portfolio by examining 2,570 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) insured commercial banks from 1990 to 1991 
using a three-stage least squares (3SLS) model. Berger et al. (2008) examining annual panel 
data for 666 publicly traded U.S. BHCs from 1992 to 2006 show that BHCs actively manage 
their capital ratios toward the target capital ratios that are set substantially above the 
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minimum capital requirements. Especially, they show that low capitalized banks adjust their 
capital ratios toward the target ratios much faster than do well capitalized banks by allowing 
adjustment speeds to vary based on BHC-specific characteristics in their partial adjustment 
models. Thus, studies are somewhat mixed. 
More importantly, there are a number of researches that examine whether capital 
regulations contribute to credit shocks. Jackson et al. (1999) conclude that banks respond to 
tightened capital regulations in the least costly way, so banks may reduce lending in response 
to external shocks on capital because issuing new equity is costly and constrained during 
economic downturns. VanHoose (2007) also argues that the theoretical literature yields a 
general agreement that short-run effects of capital regulation lead to a decline in the loan 
supply. Furfine (2001) also suggests that capital regulation played a role in the credit crunch 
of the 1990s by affecting the optimal portfolio allocation of banks. The results imply that if 
banks manage their capital ratios actively by adjusting their portfolio composition, there 
would be a strong relationship between bank capital and lending.   
 
 
III. Hypotheses 
 
Most of the literature cited above focus on the linear relationship between the bank 
capital ratio and lending or examine whether there is a structural change in response to 
external shocks. The latter studies use models that allow an interaction term of the bank 
capital ratio and the crisis dummy to see if well-capitalized banks supply more lending than 
do low-capitalized banks during the crisis period.  
On the other hand, Brei et al. (2013) incorporate a quadratic term of the capital ratio in 
their equations to capture non-linear effects of a change of the capital ratio on lending. They 
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find that the effect of the capital ratio increase is positive on bank lending and this positive 
effect decreases in marginal terms in a normal time while increasing in crisis. Importantly, 
they suggest that the effect of banks’ capitalization on loan growth turns positive in crisis 
only after the bank capital ratio exceeds a threshold, so a recapitalization should be sufficient 
enough to be effective. Carlson et al. (2011) also find the nonlinear effect of the capital ratio 
on loan growth. They show that the impact of the capital ratio on loan growth is greater when 
the capital ratio is relatively low and closer to the regulatory minimum requirement.  
In this context, this study starts from the idea that the effect of a change of the capital 
ratio may differ depending on other bank-specific characteristics as it differs depending on 
the level of the capital ratio itself. In this paper, among various types of bank-specific 
characteristics, liquidity level is examined. 
Figure 2 shows a negative relationship between liquid assets and loans. It is reasonable 
to think that banks having a high proportion of loans on the balance sheets are likely to have a 
low level of liquid assets such as cash and securities. According to Acharya et al. (2010), 
banks hold liquid assets for various reasons even if liquid assets usually have lower returns 
than illiquid assets like loans. Generally speaking, banks want to hold liquid assets 
sufficiently for the precautionary motive to survive the crisis. Banks that face a shortage of 
liquid assets experience a difficulty in raising external finance, thus suffer from fire-sale 
discounts especially during the distressed periods. However, as illiquid assets are attractive in 
terms of profits, banks may set a certain preferred level of the liquidity ratio based on the 
tradeoff relationship between the low and high level of liquidity. Acharya et al. (2010) argue 
that bank liquidity is countercyclical, so banks tend to have lower liquidity during economic 
boom periods and higher liquidity during the crisis. Cornett et al. (2011) also find that banks 
build up liquidity buffers in response to the increased risk during the crisis. Thus, banks’ 
efforts to increase liquidity buffers during the recent financial crisis result in a decline of 
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credit supply. In this context, one can expect that whether banks would expand supply of 
credit may depend of the level of bank liquidity. That is to say, the effect of the capital ratio 
on bank credit supply may differ depending on the level of the liquidity ratio. To understand 
possible responses of banks to the increased capital ratios, some elementary balance sheet 
arithmetic is used below.  
Suppose that there are two banks, A and B. Bank A is of assets 100, liquid assets 50, 
loans 50, debt 90, and equity 10. Bank B is of assets 100, liquid assets 10, loans 90, debt 90, 
and equity 10. Now suppose that there is a positive capital shock, so capital increase by 1 in 
both banks. If banks want to stay at the same level of leverage, they would like to increase 
debt by 9. In fact, it does not matter if banks keep the leverage level since the focus of this 
paper is on the asset composition side. Anyway, assets of both banks increase by 10. Our 
interest is which a bank would increase loans more. Other things are being equal, it is 
expected that bank A with more liquid assets would be able to supply more credit than bank 
B, so the effect of the capital increase on lending is greater for bank A. Banks like bank B are 
likely to invest more in liquid assets rather supplying loans until they hold sufficient liquid 
assets although a certain sufficient level may depend on other bank-specific characteristics. 
This view is consistent with Kashyap and Stein (2000) arguing that less liquid banks are 
likely to reduce loans in order to maintain their liquid assets holdings above the dangerously 
low level. Therefore, the main hypothesis is as follow. 
(Hypotheses) The effects of the capital ratio and liquidity ratio changes are positive on bank 
lending and these effects positively depend on the level of each ratio. In other words, there is 
a positive interaction effect between the capital ratio and liquidity ratio, so the effect of 
additional capital (liquid assets) on the supply of credit is greater for banks with more liquid 
assets (capital).  
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 The expectation for positive effects of the capital and liquidity ratios on lending is 
also based on the following ideas. Liquidity can be defined by a funding perspective and an 
operating perspective or both perspectives together. 3  While the definitions of NCR and 
NSFR4, which are suggested by the BCBS recently, incorporate both funding and operating 
perspectives, the liquidity ratio used in this paper represents the liquidity level of the 
operating side only. Meanwhile, capital ratio may represent the liquidity level of the funding 
side. From an operating perspective, banks with assets that have short maturities and 
marketable are considered in a good liquidity status. In contrast, banks with liabilities that 
have long maturities and not demandable easily by creditors and investors are viewed as 
having good liquidity from a funding perspective. Thus, it is expected that banks with a high 
level of the capital ratio have a greater ability to supply more credit than banks with a low 
level of the capital ratio based on their more stable liability structures. For such a reason, 
banks having more liquid assets are able to supply more credit as they already have sufficient 
liquid assets. These expectations are consistent with empirical results of the previous studies 
(e.g., see Kashyap and Stein, 2000; Berrospide and Edge, 2010; Cornett et al., 2011; Brei et 
al., 2013).  
  
 
IV. Data 
 
This study uses U.S. commercial bank data obtained from the FDIC Statistics on 
Depository Institutions (SDI), which provide detailed financial reports of FDIC-insured 
                                                                
3 This view is consistent with Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) and Brunnermeier (2009). They define 
liquidity in two categories; “funding liquidity” and “market liquidity”. The former describes how easily expert 
investors and arbitrageurs can raise money from financiers while the latter describes how easily money can be 
raised by selling assets. 
4 The Liquidity Coverage Ratio (NCR) and the Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) are developed to ensure that 
banks have sufficient high quality liquid assets and a sustainable maturity structure of assets and liabilities to 
survive an severe stress scenario lasting for one month and for one year, respectively (see BCBS, 2011). 
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institutions in standardized formats. In the dataset, 9,328 institutions at 2003 Q1 and 7,667 
institutions at 2010 Q4 are reported, but this study only covers banks having a bank charter 
class “N”. A classification code is assigned by the FDIC based on the institution’s charter 
type, charter agent, federal reserve membership status and its primary federal regulator. The 
classification code “N” means national charter and fed member commercial banks that are 
supervised by the office of the comptroller of the currency (OCC). Banks that are assigned to 
the code “N” account for 63.2% in terms of asset size, so focusing on this type of banks is 
reasonable. Applying this criterion leaves us 2,065 banks at 2003 Q1 and 1,383 banks at 2010 
Q4. A detailed explanation about the bank classification is summarized in the table 1. 
The sample for this study is on a quarterly frequency and consists of a balanced panel 
of U.S. commercial banks that have operated continuously from 2003 Q1 to 2010 Q4. There 
are two reasons the period between 2003 and 2010 is chosen. First, it covers two different 
economic periods in U.S.; the economic boom period (2003 Q1 to 2007 Q2) and the recent 
crisis period (2007 Q3 to 2010 Q4). To see if there is a structural change during the crisis, 
only one period of economic boom and crisis is covered. The years before 2003 are excluded 
because there was a “dot-com crush” from 2000 to 2002. Second, according to Papanikolaou 
and Wolff (2010), there have been no considerable regulatory changes in the U.S. during the 
examined period, which could have changed the banks’ behavior. For instance, U.S. banks 
and BHCs still report their regulatory capital ratios under the Basel I, which was adopted in 
1988 and took full effect in 19925, and General Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) 
accounting conventions. A balanced panel is used since the study is intended to examine the 
behavior of normal banks although using a balanced panel is subject to a survivorship bias. 
Banks under extreme conditions may behave differently, so it may lead us to unexpected 
conclusions.  
                                                                
5 See Wall and Peterson (1996) and Lee and Stebunovs (2012) for an overview of major changes in capital 
regulation in the U.S. 
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Some adjustments are applied to mitigate the influence of missing or outlier values and 
possible mergers and acquisitions. First of all, banks that have violated the regulatory capital 
requirements during the examined period are excluded because banks that are considered as 
undercapitalized face a variety of mandatory and discretionary supervisory actions such as 
restrictions on asset growth and dividend payments. Thus, observations are dropped if total 
risk-based capital ratio is less than 8% or tier 1 risk-based capital ratio is less than 4% or 
leverage ratio is less than 4%. Meanwhile, banks that reported total-risk based capital ratio 
more than 40% are also excluded as it is considered abnormally high. In terms of the 
liquidity, observations are dropped if the liquidity ratio is less than 0%. Banks that grow more 
than 50% or less than -50% quarterly in assets, loans and credit are also excluded to reduce a 
possibility of mergers and acquisitions. At last, banks having a risk-weighted assets to total 
assets ratio over 100% are not included. As a result, 1,050 U.S. commercial banks are left in 
the final sample. A description of the dataset is summarized in the table 2. 
In the case of macroeconomic data, real GDP data are obtained from U.S. Bureau of 
Economic Analysis (BEA) and 3-month federal funds effective rates are obtained from 
Federal Reserve Bank (FRB).   
 
 
V. Econometric model and variables 
 
Econometric model specification 
The main interest is to examine whether the relationship between bank capital and 
lending depends on the level of the liquidity. To test this hypothesis, a bank capital ratio 
variable is interacted with a bank liquidity ratio variable, thus allowing a coefficient on the 
bank capital ratio variable to fluctuate as the liquidity ratio changes. To this end, the 
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econometric model used by Brei et al. (2013) is employed with some adjustments. First of all, 
a quadratic term of capital ratio is not included, instead the interaction term of the capital 
ratio and the liquidity ratio is included to examine the main hypothesis. In addition, some 
variables that are not considered by Brei et al. (2013) are included. Therefore, the empirical 
model is given by the following equation. 
𝐿𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽0𝐿𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝐶𝐶𝐶 ∗ 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝚾𝑖,𝑡−1 
+𝛿1∆𝐺𝐺𝐶𝑡−1 + 𝛿2∆𝑀𝐶𝑡−1 + �𝜑𝑠Q𝑠4
𝑠=2
+ 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                                      (1) 
where i denotes number of banks and t denotes quarterly time dimension. 
In this econometric model, each coefficient captures the short-term impact on lending 
in response to a change in the variable. In contrast, the long-term impact is expressed by 
dividing each coefficient by (1-𝛽0). For example, Δ𝐿𝑖,𝑡/Δ𝐗𝑖,𝑡−1 = 𝛾/(1 − 𝛽0) is the long-
term impact on loan growth rate in response to a change in the variable in vector X.  
The dependent variable (Li,t) is the quarterly growth rate of lending in period t of bank 
i. Following most of literature, for example, Kashyap and Stein (1995), Gambacorta and 
Mistrulli (2004), Berrospide and Edge (2010), Drehmann and Gambacorta (2011), Brei et al. 
(2013), and Kapan and Minoiu (2013), the growth rate of the dependent variable is used 
instead of the variable in levels to mitigate spurious correlation.  
As explanatory variables, bank-specific characteristic variables and macroeconomic 
control variables are included. Bank-specific variables used by Brei et al. (2013) are all 
included except the square term of the regulatory capital ratio. These variables are bank 
regulatory capital ratios (CAPi,t-1), bank liquidity ratio (LIQi,t-1), market funding ratio 
(MFUNDi,t-1) and log of total assets (SIZEi,t-1). With these variables, additional bank-specific 
characteristic variables that are considered as important control variables affecting bank 
lending by the previous literature are used. For example, the ratio of unused commitments 
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(COMMITi,t-1) is included as it is pointed out by Cornett et al. (2011), unused commitments 
are important explanatory variable affecting bank lending by exposing banks to liquidity risk. 
The ratio of return on total assets (ROAt-1) is used as a bank profitability proxy, and the ratio 
of noncurrent loans to total loans is used as a bank asset quality indicator. Bank specific 
characteristics except the capital ratio and the liquidity ratio are included in vector Xi,t-1. All 
bank-specific characteristic variables except capital ratios are normalized to their mean 
values. Capital ratios are normalized to the minimum regulatory requirements (i.e., 8% for 
total risk-based capital ratio, 4% for tier1 risk-based capital ratio and leverage ratio).  
In addition, a quarterly growth rate of real GDP (△GDPt-1) and a change in the 3-month 
federal funds effective rate (△MPt-1) are included to account for macroeconomic conditions 
and loan demand effects. When these macroeconomic control variables are not included, 
yearly time fixed dummies are used instead. At last, 𝛼𝑖 represents bank-level fixed effects that 
capture unobserved bank characteristics and quarterly dummies (Qs) are included in all the 
regressions to capture seasonal influences. All bank-specific variables and macroeconomic 
control variables are lagged one period to mitigate a possible endogeneity bias. 
This study focuses only on fixed effects panel methodology while Brei et al. (2013) 
employ a dynamic system Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) panel methodology 
developed by Blundell and Bond (1998) to ensure efficiency and consistency. Brei et al. 
(2013) and Gambacorta and Mistrulli (2004) argue that this methodology ensures efficiency 
and consistency as long as the models do not suffer from serial correlation of order two and 
valid instruments are used.  
However, Roodman (2006) recommends that fixed effects estimators may work better 
than system GMM when time dimension T is large because dynamic panel bias becomes 
insignificant while the number of instruments tends to explode as time dimension T increases. 
Furthermore, Judson and Owen (1999) suggest that fixed effects estimators perform well or 
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even better when the time dimension of the panel data T is greater than 30. Judson and Owen 
(1999) also argue that fixed effects estimators may be chosen even when the time dimension 
is 20 for balanced panel data. Since the time dimension of the dataset is 30 for the most 
regressions and the minimum is 22, this study just sticks to the bank fixed effects panel 
model. In fact, the fixed effects methodology is also used commonly in a number of the 
literature (e.g., see Berrospide and Edge, 2010; Francis and Osborne, 2010; Cornett et al., 
2011).  
Meanwhile, fixed effects are chosen over random effects based on the Hausman test 
results albeit not reported. Choosing fixed effects over random effects is also reasonable 
because bank effects are likely to be time invariant during the examined period, which is 
considered not long enough time to change each bank’s inherent characteristics. As argued by 
Brei et al. (2013), the fact that the sample of banks is not randomly chosen from the 
population of banks also supports the choice of fixed effects estimations. 
Before moving to the main regression, the linear regressions that exclude the 
interaction term of the capital ratio and the liquidity ratio are examined. Furthermore, the 
crisis dummy is interacted with all bank-specific characteristics variables to see if there is a 
structural change in coefficients on these variables in response to external economic shocks.  
Variables and expected signs 
Loan growth (Lt): To examine whether an increase in bank capital ratio leads to an increase 
in bank lending, quarterly growth rates of net loans and credit are used. Variables are 
calculated as 100×(ln(Lt)-ln(Lt-1)), where Lt represents net loans and credit in the on and off 
balance sheets at time t. As Cornett et al. (2011) and Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010) point 
out, drawdowns of unused commitments not caused by the expiration of the term do not 
affect the total amount of credit because the same amount of loans increases. For this reason, 
credit lines opened before the crisis are useful for borrowers because they can use unused 
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commitments when banks are reluctant to lend. Thus, an increase in loans caused by 
drawdowns of unused commitments is likely to affect banks’ lending behavior as well as a 
relationship between bank capital and lending. This study follows Cornett et al. (2011) 
approach to deal with these changes from off balance sheet to on balance sheet by adding the 
credit growth variable as a dependent variable.    
Capital (CAPt-1): There are various capital ratios, but only regulatory capital ratios are 
considered for this study. The minimum capital requirements are set on three types of capital 
ratio measurement; total risk-based capital ratio, tier 1 risk-based capital ratio, and leverage 
ratio. Total risk-based capital ratio is defined core capital (tier 1) plus supplementary capital 
(tier 2) over risk-weighted assets and should be at least 8% to be regarded as adequately 
capitalized banks. Tier 1 risk-based capital ratio includes only core capital in the numerator 
and divided by risk-weighted assets and should be at least 4%. Leverage ratio is defined as 
core capital (tier 1) over total average assets rather than risk-weighted assets. All three types 
of regulatory capital ratios are considered in the regressions and coefficients on these 
regulatory capital ratios are expected to be positive. Coefficients on the interaction term with 
crisis dummy are also expected to be positive because well-capitalized banks are better able 
to absorb the negative effects of shocks on bank lending (see Meh and Moran, 2010; 
Gambacorta and Mistrulli, 2004; Carlson et al., 2011; Kapan and Minoiu, 2013). 
Liquidity (LIQt-1): As mentioned in the hypotheses chapter, liquidity can be defined in 
various ways, but the definition of liquidity is limited to the operating side in this paper. In 
other words, liquidity in this paper means how sufficient liquid assets banks hold in their 
asset side of balance sheets. Then, what assets are treated as liquid assets? Generally 
speaking, cash and securities are treated as liquid assets, but researchers adjust definitions 
based on the availability of specific information and their judgment. For example, Berrospide 
and Edge (2010) and Das and N.R. Sy (2012) use a securities over assets ratio as a proxy for 
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liquidity ratio while Drehmann and Gambacorta (2011) and Gambacorta and Mistrulli (2004) 
include cash and securities in the liquid assets. Brei et al. (2013) treat cash, trading securities 
and interbank lending with maturity less than 3 months as liquid assets.  
However, it seems that the definitions used by Shim (2013) are reasonable the most. 
Shim (2013) defines cash and balances due from depository institutions, securities, federal 
funds and trading account assets less pledged securities as liquid assets. It is rational to think 
that only assets that are pledgeable and available for sales are considered as liquid assets, so 
this paper follows this definition. Coefficients on the liquidity ratio are expected to be 
positive for the reasons discussed earlier in the hypotheses section and these positive effects 
on bank lending would be greater during the crisis period, which is the time when banks 
desperately need liquid assets.  
Interaction term (CAP*LIQt-1): To verify the coefficients on this interaction term is the 
main interest of this study. As discussed previously in the hypotheses section, the expected 
sign on this term is positive. The effects of additional capital (liquid assets) on bank lending 
would be greater for banks with more liquid assets (capital). When the interaction term is 
included in the regressions, bank capital ratios and liquidity ratio variables are normalized to 
the minimum regulatory capital ratios and its average across all banks in the sample 
respectively in order to obtain the meaningful coefficients. This means that the coefficients on 
capital ratios are interpreted as the effects on the banks with the average liquidity ratio while 
the coefficients on liquidity ratio mean the effects on the banks having minimum regulatory 
capital ratios (i.e., 8% for total risk-based capital ratio, 4% for tier1 risk-based capital ratio 
and leverage ratio).    
Bank size (SIZEt-1): Bank size is measured by the natural logarithm of total assets. The 
expected sign on this variable is ambiguous. According to the “too big to fail” theory, larger 
banks have incentives to take more risk by the high expectation of government’s bailout to 
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prevent systemic risk, thus may supply more credit. However, larger banks can diversify their 
portfolio by investing various types of securities and involve in various activities while 
smaller banks tend to focus on the traditional lending activity. Looked at in this perspective, 
the size effect could be negative.  
Funding structure (MFUNDt-1): Broadly speaking, liabilities consist of deposits and non-
deposits. This variable is measured as the ratio of total liabilities minus total deposits to total 
assets. Although the expected sign on this variable is uncertain, the positive sign is expected 
before the crisis and the negative sign is expected during the crisis. This is because banks 
may rely more on market funding, which is usually considered cheaper and easier to 
accumulate during the economic boom period, to expand their balance sheets. On the other 
hand, as Brei et al. (2013), Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010), Cornett et al. (2011), and 
Gambacorta and Marques-Ibanez (2011) argue, it is expected that banks that rely more on 
market funding cut more lending during the crisis because they are more vulnerable to 
external shocks. In other words, banks having better access to deposit financing cut lending 
less than banks relying on market funding during the crisis period. 
Unused commitments (COMMITt-1): Cornett et al. (2011) and Ivashina and Scharfstein 
(2010) show that this variable, which is measured by the ratio of the unused commitments to 
total assets, is an important determinant of bank lending behavior. Interestingly, the expected 
sign is different by the type of the dependent variable. The expected sign is positive for the 
growth rate of loans while negative for the growth rate of credit because drawdowns of 
unused commitments increase loans but do not affect the amount of credit. These effects are 
expected to be greater during the crisis. Banks that are exposed to a higher level of unused 
commitments would supply more loans unwillingly as the increased credit-line drawdowns 
during the crisis transfer assets from off-balance sheets to on-balance sheets. As a result, 
those banks reduce the supply of new credit more than other banks. 
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Profitability (ROAt-1): The profitability is measured as the ratio of net income after taxes and 
extraordinary items to total assets. Banks with a higher profitability are likely to have strong 
balance sheets because the profitability relates to the quality and quantity of capital ratios. On 
the other hand, the higher profitability may imply a greater risk in assets, so more loans. In 
either view, a positive relationship between the profitability and bank lending is expected. 
Loan quality (NPLt-1): The ratio of noncurrent loans to total loans reflects the quality of 
banks’ loan portfolio. The higher the level, the worse the quality becomes. Banks would cut 
lending more as the loan quality gets worse. Thus, the expected sign on this variable is 
negative.  
Macroeconomic variables: To incorporate the effects of business cycle and monetary policy, 
a growth rate of real GDP (△GDPt-1) and changes in the 3-month federal funds effective rate 
(△MPt-1) are used. The expected sign on the growth rate of real GDP is positive due to the 
inherent procyclicality of bank lending and increased loan demands. On the other hand, the 
effect of interest rate changes on bank lending is expected to be negative since an increase of 
market rates lead to decreased loan demands. 
Crisis dummy (CRISISt): To examine whether there was a structural change in response to 
external economic shocks, the crisis dummy is interacted with bank-specific characteristics 
variables. The crisis dummy is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 for the crisis 
period and 0 elsewhere. It is hard to define the crisis period. It is commonly defined as 
beginning at 2007 Q3, but arguable when it has ended or would end.  
This paper employs two definitions of the crisis period. The first one, following the 
definition used by Cornett et al. (2011), is the period from 2007 Q3 to 2009 Q2. The credit 
spread between 3-month commercial paper market rate and 3-month T-bill secondary market 
rate reflects this view (see Figure 3). However, growth rates of loans and commercial and 
industrial loans (see Figure 1) show that the period from 2007 Q3 to 2010 Q4 can be well 
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defined crisis period in terms of banks’ responses to external shocks. This period reflects the 
most severe drops of loan supply by banks.  
 
 
VI. Estimation results 
 
Linear regression results 
Before moving to the main regression results, the baseline regressions, which examine 
the linear relationship between bank lending and bank-specific characteristic variables, are 
presented. Table 5 reports the linear regression results. In Eqs (1)-(2), the growth rate of net 
loans is used as the dependent variables while the growth rate of credit is used in Eqs (3)-(4) 
instead of the growth rate of loans.  
First of all, the estimated coefficients of capital ratio and liquidity ratio are positive and 
statistically significant. The effects of additional capital and liquid assets on loan growth rate 
are positive as expected. Thus, it supports the view that banks with high level of capital ratio 
and liquidity have a greater ability to supply credit than banks with low level of capital ratio 
and liquidity based on their strong balance sheets. In terms of magnitude of coefficients, the 
results in Eqs (1) and (2) suggest that a 1 percentage point increase in the capital ratio boosts 
annualized loan growth by about 0.6~0.7 percentage point. Interestingly, the effect of capital 
ratio on credit is very small and statistically less significant. The result may imply that banks 
are less constrained by the regulatory capital ratio when they expand their credit by supplying 
credit-lines to their customers. This is because risk-weights for off-balance sheet activities are 
lower than on-balance sheet activities.  
All the additional variables (COMMITt-1, ROAt-1, NPLt-1) are turned out to be 
statistically significant with expected signs. Thus, it supports that those variables are 
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important determinants of bank lending. In all regressions, expected signs for coefficients on 
other control variables are obtained. The size effect is turned out to be negative. This may 
imply that small banks focus on traditional lending activity, so supply relatively more lending 
than do large banks. Market funding effect is positive albeit not significant in Eqs (3)-(4). It 
suggests that U.S. commercial banks have relied on market funding during the examined 
period to boost their lending even if the effect is relatively modest. Meanwhile, the results 
show the importance of the role of the unused commitment ratio on loan growth. As 
discussed earlier, the effect of unused commitment changes is positive on loan growth but 
negative on credit growth. The magnitude of coefficients is great and statistically very 
significant. This means that lending by banks that are exposed more to credit-line risk would 
increase by credit-line drawdowns. Then, those banks would reduce the supply of new loans 
or credit-line in response to the increased takedown demands. Therefore, the effects of 
unused commitment on loan growth and credit growth are opposite. The coefficients on 
profitability (ROAt-1) and loan quality (NPLt-1) also have expected signs and are statistically 
significant and consistent in all regressions. While the increased profitability has a positive 
impact on loan growth, low quality of loans deteriorates banks’ ability to supply loans. 
At last, macroeconomic variables are used when yearly time dummies are not included, 
and the results are not affected significantly by this. A half percentage point increase in the 3-
month federal funds effective rate change, which is a proxy for monetary policy, is associated 
with about 0.2 percentage point decrease of loan growth and 0.12 percentage point decrease 
of credit growth in the following quarter. The effect is strongly significant and negative as 
expected. In later, it is found that the coefficient on this variable is positive (see table 9), 
albeit not statistically significant, for large banks. This result is in line with Kashyap and 
Stein (1995), showing that small banks response more sensitively than large banks to the 
monetary policy. 
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On the other hand, none of the coefficients on the growth rate of real GDP variable are 
significant, nor deviates from zero. Interestingly, in later regressions done by bank size (see 
table 9), the coefficients on the GDP growth for large banks are positive and statistically 
significant while not significant for medium and small banks. It may suggest that large banks 
are more procyclical than medium and small banks to the business cycle. Large banks supply 
more credit during the economic boom and cut credit supply more during the crisis than do 
medium and small banks. Since the level of capital ratios of large banks is much lower than 
those of medium and small banks, this is consistent with the result of Gambacorta and 
Mistrulli (2004), suggesting that well-capitalized banks supply credit less procyclically to 
GDP shocks.    
 Table 6 reports the linear regression results with crisis interactions. All the bank-
specific characteristic variables are interacted with crisis dummy. As discussed before in the 
econometric model and variables section, two types of crisis dummies are used. The first one 
defines the crisis as the period between 2007 Q3 and 2009 Q2, and used in Eqs (1)-(2). The 
second one covers the period from 2007 Q3 to 2010 Q4, and used in Eqs (3)-(4). Overall, the 
results are not significantly different, but the second definition of the crisis dummy seems to 
capture the crisis period better in the light of the previous literature. Well-capitalized banks 
and more liquid banks supply more lending than do low-capitalized banks and less liquid 
banks in response to external economic shocks (see Cornett et al., 2011; Brei et al., 2013; 
Gambacorta and Mistrulli, 2004; Gambacorta and Marques-Ibanez, 2011; Kapan and Minoiu, 
2013; Carlson et al., 2011). Regression results in Eqs (3)-(4) are more pronounced than 
regression results in Eqs (1)-(2). The impacts of capital ratio and liquid assets on loan and 
credit growth are greater during the crisis, so they matter more for banks to supply credit in 
response to external economic shocks.   
Interaction effect of bank capital and liquidity ratio 
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 Table 7 reports the interaction effects of capital ratios and liquid assets on loan growth 
and credit growth for all types of regulatory capital ratios. In regression models with an 
interaction term, the coefficients for capital ratios and liquidity ratio reflect conditional 
impacts of these variables on loan growth and credit growth. Since liquidity ratio is 
normalized to its mean value, the coefficients on capital ratios are interpreted as the effect of 
capital ratios on loan and credit growth for banks with the average liquidity ratio. In the same 
way, the coefficients on liquidity ratio mean the effect of liquidity ratio on loan and credit 
growth for banks with the minimum regulatory capital requirements since capital ratios are 
normalized to their minimum regulatory requirements (8% for total risk-based ratio, 4% for 
tier 1 risk-based ratio and leverage ratio). 
The results in the table 7 are different depending on the type of the dependent variable. 
Although positive interaction effects of capital ratio and liquid assets on loan growth are 
found in Eqs (1)-(3), the coefficients are small and statistically not significant. However, the 
coefficients on the interaction terms in Eqs (4)-(6), where credit growth is used as dependent 
variables, are turned out to be positive and statistically significant. One standard deviation 
increase of liquidity ratio from its mean boosts the effects of capital ratio on credit growth by 
about 0.04~0.06 percentage points although the coefficient on the interaction term for 
leverage ratio is not statistically significant. When considering the effects of capital ratio on 
credit growth is about 0.05~0.07 percentage points, this impact is meaningful. On the other 
hand, this interaction effects are not worthwhile for the effects of liquidity ratio on credit 
growth in the light of relatively small volatile of capital ratios. Figure 4 illustrates how the 
effects of capital ratio on credit growth change depending on the level of liquidity ratio and 
how the effect of liquidity ratio on credit growth changes depending on the level of capital 
ratios. 
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In table 8, crisis dummy is interacted with all the bank-specific characteristic variables 
including the interaction term in order to examine there was a structural change in response to 
the external shock. The coefficients on the interaction term increase a little bit, but not 
significantly different from the results in table 7. Furthermore, the coefficients on the 
interaction term with crisis dummy are not statistically significant. Thus, it is concluded that 
the interaction effects of capital ratio and liquidity ratio did not change during the crisis 
period.  
Regression results by bank size are presented in the table 9. Large banks are those 
banks with assets greater than $10 billion, medium banks are those banks with assets between 
$1 billion and $10 billion, and small banks are those banks with assets less than $1 billion at 
2003 Q1. As a result, 56 banks, 540 banks, and 454 banks are classified into large banks, 
medium banks, and small banks, respectively. Interestingly, the previous results hold only for 
large banks. In the case of large banks, the interaction effects of capital ratios and liquidity 
ratio are much greater than the results of Eqs (4)-(6) in the table 7. One standard deviation 
increase of liquidity ratio from its mean increases the effects of capital ratios on credit growth 
by more than 0.1 percentage points. This also suggests that the effects of capital ratios on 
credit growth could be almost none or even negative at the very low level of liquidity ratio. 
Furthermore, negative signs for the coefficients on liquidity ratio suggest that the effect of 
liquidity ratio on credit growth becomes positive only after capital ratios exceed certain level. 
This is well depicted in the figure 5. 
The fact that the interaction effects are significant only for large banks may imply that 
large banks manage their capital ratios and liquidity ratio more actively and simultaneously. 
This is inferred from the context that large banks tend to maintain the lower levels of capital 
ratios and liquidity ratio than do medium and small banks. It could make large banks more 
sensitive to changes in capital ratios and liquidity ratio.  
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VII. Robustness 
 
About the estimation period, including the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) 
implementation period could be one potential problem distorting the results. TARP was one 
of the major programs implemented by the Treasury in response to the recent financial crisis 
in order to stabilize the financial system. The beginning of the program was on October 28, 
2008, when the Treasury decided to inject capital into nine largest banks under the Capital 
Purchase Program (CPP) (Black and Hazelwood, 2012).  
According to Black and Hazelwood (2012) and Berrospide and Edge (2010), one of the 
objectives of the CPP was to boost bank lending by injecting capital through purchases of 
preferred stock with warrants. As a result, capital ratios of U.S. banks increased significantly 
after 2008 Q4. Figure 6 shows how significantly regulatory capital ratios for the examined 
banks have increased after TARP capital injections. For this reason, Berrospide and Edge 
(2010) cut the estimation period before 2008 Q4, which is the beginning of TARP capital 
injections, in order to prevent it from distorting the regression results. Black and Hazelwood 
(2012) argue that recipient banks of TARP funds were encouraged to increase loans. Using an 
event-study methodology and loan-level regressions, they find that the effect of TARP on 
bank risk-taking is positive for large banks while negative for small banks. Therefore, the 
period excluding the period after TARP capital injections are examined in order to test 
whether the main results are robust.  
The results are reported in the table 10. The interaction effects remain at the similar 
level for the sample including all the banks. In the case of regression results for large banks, 
the coefficients on the interaction terms increase except it for total risk-based ratio. Therefore, 
it is concluded that the effect of capital ratio on credit growth is positively associated with the 
level of liquidity ratio even after excluding the period after TARP capital injections.  
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VIII. Conclusions and policy implications 
 
Using the balanced 1,050 U.S. commercial banks quarterly data from 2003 Q1 to 2010 
Q4, this paper examines the effect of bank capital on lending in various ways. First of all, this 
paper finds that there is a statistically positive effect of bank capital on loan growth. The 
results suggest that a 1 percentage point increase in capital ratio boosts annualized loan 
growth by about 0.6~0.7 percentage point. This positive effect is also found for another 
dependent variable, credit growth, albeit the magnitude is relatively modest. To see whether 
there was a structural change during the recent financial crisis, crisis dummy is interacted 
with all bank-specific characteristic variables. The results show that the effects of bank 
capital ratios on loan growth and credit growth are stronger during the crisis period. Those 
results are consistent with the previous literature. 
More importantly, this paper examines whether the effect of a change of bank capital 
ratios on lending differs depending on the level of liquidity. This paper finds that the effect of 
bank capital on credit growth relates positively to the level of bank liquid assets. It also 
shows that the positive effect of bank capital increase on credit growth is significant only 
after banks retain enough liquid assets. This interaction effect did not change during the 
recent financial crisis period, and were more prominent for large banks.  
The results suggest three important policy implications. First, any policy actions to 
sustain bank lending, for example capital injections and liquidity support, are complementary 
and should be implemented harmoniously to be more effective. Second, if only capital 
injection is implemented, this would be more effective for banks with high liquid assets in the 
light of boosting credit supply. At last, recent international regulatory reform efforts to induce 
banks to hold more liquid assets and capital are supported. The results imply that banks with 
more liquid assets and capital would be able to supply more credit thanks to their increased 
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capability of absorbing negative economic shocks. 
This paper makes two contributions to the literature. First, it shows that the interaction 
effect of bank capital and liquidity on credit supply is significant, which may imply that the 
relationship between bank capital and lending is complicated rather than a linear. Researches 
to date have focused on the linear relationship between bank capital and lending. Second, it 
shows that a role of unused commitments should be considered when analyzing the effect of 
bank capital on lending. The main results of this paper hold only when unused commitments 
are included in the definition of lending, implying that credit, which is defined as net loans on 
the balance sheet plus unused commitments off the balance sheet, is maybe the more 
appropriate measure for bank lending.  
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Figure 1. Growth rates of loans and Commercial and Industrial loans 
 
 
Source: Federal Reserve Bank H.8. 
Note: Annual growth rates, seasonally adjusted. A shaded area is from 2007q3 to 2010q4. 
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Figure 2. The trend of the proportions of liquid assets and loans 
(a) 
 
(b) 
 
Source: Federal Reserve Bank H.8. Assets and liabilities of commercial banks in the United States. 
Note: Liquidity ratio = (cash + securities + interbank loans + fed funds and reverse RPs with banks) / total 
assets 
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Figure 3. Credit spread 
 
Source: Federal Reserve Bank H15. 
Note: 3-month commercial paper (Financial) market rate – 3-month T-bill secondary market rate. A shaded area 
is from 2007q3 to 2009q2. 
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Figure 4. The effects of capital ratio and liquidity ratio on credit growth for all banks 
(A-1) △CREDITt /△CAPt-1 (B-1) △CREDITt /△LIQt-1 
  
(A-2) △CREDITt /△TIERt-1 (B-2) △CREDITt /△LIQt-1 
  
(A-3) △CREDITt /△LEVt-1 (B-3) △CREDITt /△LIQt-1 
  
 
Note: The figures illustrate the results of Eqs (4)-(6) in the table 7. The change in the growth rate of credit for a 
1 percentage point increase in the regulatory capital ratio (left column).  The change in the growth rate of credit 
for a 1 percentage point increase in the liquidity ratio (right column). The dashed lines are 10% and 90% 
confidence intervals calculated with the delta method. 
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Figure 5. The effects of capital ratio and liquidity ratio on credit growth for large banks 
(A-1) △CREDITt /△CAPt-1 (B-1) △CREDITt /△LIQt-1 
  
(A-2) △CREDITt /△TIERt-1 (B-2) △CREDITt /△LIQt-1 
  
(A-3) △CREDITt /△LEVt-1 (B-3) △CREDITt /△LIQt-1 
  
 
Note: The figures illustrate the results of Eqs (1)-(3) in the table 9. The change in the growth rate of credit for a 
1 percentage point increase in the regulatory capital ratio (left column).  The change in the growth rate of credit 
for a 1 percentage point increase in the liquidity ratio (right column). The dashed lines are 10% and 90% 
confidence intervals calculated with the delta method. 
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Figure 6. Regulatory capital ratios and TARP capital injections 
 
Source: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Statistics on Depository Institutions (FDIC SDI). 
Note: The graph is obtained from the sample, all the examined 1,050 banks. 
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Table 1. Definition of bank charter class and the share of assets 
code Description No. of banks Share 
N National(federal) charter and fed member commercial banks that are supervised by the OCC 1,383 63.2% 
NM State charter and fed nonmember commercial banks that are supervised by the FDIC 4,318 14.5% 
SM State charter and fed member commercial banks that are supervised by the federal reserve 829 12.7% 
SA FDIC supervised state chartered thrifts and OCC supervised federally chartered thrifts 731 7.0% 
SB State charter saving banks that are supervised by the FDIC 397 2.4% 
OI Insured U.S. branch of a foreign chartered institution 9 0.2% 
 
Source: FDIC SDI. 
Note: Descriptions are taken from the FDIC SDI variable definitions. Data are as of 2010q4. 
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Table 3. Definition and source of the variables used in the regressions 
Variable Description Source 
 
Dependent variables 
LOANt Quarterly growth rate of loans (%) FDIC SDI 
CREDITt Quarterly growth rate of loans and unused commitments (%) FDIC SDI 
 
Bank-specific characteristic variables 
CAPt-1 Total risk-based ratio (%) FDIC SDI 
TIERt-1 Tier 1 risk-based ratio (%) FDIC SDI 
LEVt-1 Leverage ratio (%) FDIC SDI 
LIQt-1 Ratio of liquid assets to total assets (%) FDIC SDI 
SIZEt-1 Logarithm of total assets FDIC SDI 
MFUNDt-1 Ratio of non-deposit liabilities to total assets (%) FDIC SDI 
COMMITt-1 Ratio of unused commitments to total assets (%) FDIC SDI 
ROAt-1 Return on total assets (%) FDIC SDI 
NPLt-1 Noncurrent loans to total loans (%) FDIC SDI 
 
Macroeconomics controls 
△GDPt-1 Quarterly growth rate of real GDP (%) BEA 
△MPt-1 Change in the 3-month federal funds effective rate (%) FRB 
CRISISt Dummy, 1 for the period between 2007q3 and 2009q2 (or 2010q4)  
 
Note: Liquid assets = (cash and balances due from depository institutions + securities + federal funds sold and 
reverse repurchases – pledged securities) 
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Table 4. Summary statistics of the variables used in the regressions 
Variable Mean Std Min p25 p75 Max 
 
Dependent variables (Lt) 
LOANt 1.28 4.92 -42.01 -1.22 3.48 48.59 
CREDITt 1.25 5.05 -46.70 -1.33 3.48 49.80 
 
Bank-specific characteristic variables 
CAPt-1 16.62 5.33 8.16 12.60 19.31 39.87 
TIERt-1 15.50 5.38 6.08 11.46 18.22 39.17 
LEVt-1 9.98 2.41 4.03 8.24 11.22 27.18 
LIQt-1 22.73 13.50 0.49 12.44 30.64 79.16 
SIZEt-1 12.04 1.29 8.89 11.23 12.63 21.14 
MFUNDt-1 6.31 7.15 0.00 0.90 9.37 88.61 
COMMITt-1 10.59 13.14 0.00 4.94 13.43 315.71 
ROAt-1 1.02 0.97 -20.69 0.69 1.42 57.32 
NPLt-1 1.34 1.89 0.00 0.26 1.69 31.50 
 
Macroeconomic controls 
△GDPt-1 0.40 0.76 -2.33 0.33 0.81 1.63 
△MPt-1 -0.04 0.49 -1.66 -0.04 0.45 0.52 
 
Note: This table reports the summary statistics of the variables used in the regressions. Data source are 
presented in the table 3 and the sample period goes from 2003q1 to 2010q4. The data are a balanced panel of  
31,500 quarterly observations for 1,050 U.S. commercial banks. LOANt and CREDITt are quarterly growth 
rates of loans and credit, which is defined as loans plus unused commitments, respectively. Growth rates are 
calculated as 100×(ln(Lt)-ln(Lt-1)). CAPt-1 is the lagged total risk-based capital ratio, TIERt-1 is the lagged tier 1 
risk-based capital ratio, and LEVt-1 is the lagged leverage ratio. LIQt-1 is the lagged liquidity ratio, which is 
defined as the liquid assets share of the total assets. Liquid assets are cash and balance due from depository 
institutions plus securities plus federal funds sold and reverse repurchases less pledged securities. SIZEt-1 is 
measured by the logarithm of the lagged total assets. Market funding (MFUNDt-1) is the lagged ratio of non-
deposit liabilities to total assets. COMMITt-1 is the lagged ratio of unused commitments to total assets. ROAt-1 is 
the lagged return on total assets and NPLt-1 is the lagged ratio of noncurrent loans to total loans. For the 
macroeconomic controls, quarterly growth rate of real GDP (△GDPt-1) and a change in the 3-month federal 
funds effective rate (△MPt-1) are used. These macroeconomic variables are also lagged by one quarter.    
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Table 5. Linear regressions 
Dependent variables LOANt CREDITt 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
LOAN(CREDIT)t-1  0.089*** 0.089*** 0.062*** 0.058*** 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.015) (0.015) 
CAPt-1 0.134*** 0.153*** 0.051 0.081** 
 (0.034) (0.032) (0.035) (0.034) 
LIQt-1 0.123*** 0.113*** 0.095*** 0.077*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
SIZEt-1 -4.541*** -3.625*** -5.785*** -4.701*** 
 (0.413) (0.272) (0.458) (0.299) 
MFUNDt-1 0.031** 0.029** 0.009 0.008 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.016) (0.015) 
COMMITt-1 0.271*** 0.281*** -0.156*** -0.130*** 
 (0.030) (0.030) (0.024) (0.023) 
ROAt-1 0.141** 0.119* 0.333*** 0.322*** 
 (0.064) (0.062) (0.080) (0.076) 
NPLt-1 -0.427*** -0.420*** -0.612*** -0.628*** 
 (0.035) (0.035) (0.037) (0.037) 
△GDPt-1  -0.000  0.010 
  (0.036)  (0.041) 
△MPt-1  -0.379***  -0.234*** 
  (0.064)  (0.068) 
Constant -1.042*** -0.358 -0.766** 0.162 
 (0.300) (0.303) (0.305) (0.313) 
     
Bank dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes No Yes No 
Quarter dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 31,500 31,500 31,500 31,500 
Number of banks 1,050 1,050 1,050 1,050 
Adjusted R-squared 0.156 0.154 0.122 0.116 
 
Note: This table reports fixed effects regression results not including an interaction term of capital ratio and 
liquidity ratio. The sample period goes from 2003q1 to 2010q4. For the capital ratio variable (CAPt-1), only total 
risk-based capital ratio is used. Capital ratio is normalized to the minimum regulatory requirement, 8%. All 
other bank-specific characteristic variables are normalized to their mean values. All the regressions include 
quarterly dummies to control for seasonal influences. Yearly dummies are included when macroeconomic 
control variables are not included. Robust standard errors, clustered at the bank-level, are reported in 
parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
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Table 6. Linear regressions with crisis interactions 
Dependent variable LOANt CREDITt LOANt CREDITt 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
LOAN(CREDIT)t-1 0.089*** 0.059*** 0.087*** 0.056*** 
 (0.012) (0.015) (0.012) (0.015) 
CAPt-1 0.148*** 0.076** 0.134*** 0.071** 
 (0.033) (0.034) (0.033) (0.035) 
CAPt-1×CRISIS 0.027* 0.024 0.042** 0.043** 
 (0.015) (0.016) (0.018) (0.018) 
LIQt-1 0.115*** 0.081*** 0.107*** 0.069*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) 
LIQt-1×CRISIS 0.002 -0.001 0.017** 0.015* 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) 
SIZEt-1 -3.691*** -4.786*** -4.027*** -4.821*** 
 (0.275) (0.307) (0.354) (0.391) 
SIZEt-1×CRISIS 0.098 0.062 0.043 -0.076 
 (0.063) (0.073) (0.080) (0.083) 
MFUNDt-1 0.028** 0.009 0.029* 0.006 
 (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
MFUNDt-1×CRISIS -0.001 -0.008 0.009 0.009 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
COMMITt-1 0.279*** -0.134*** 0.279*** -0.130*** 
 (0.029) (0.023) (0.028) (0.022) 
COMMITt-1×CRISIS 0.002 -0.011*** 0.011* -0.010*** 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.006) (0.004) 
ROAt-1 0.119* 0.325*** 0.059 0.193** 
 (0.064) (0.084) (0.084) (0.090) 
ROAt-1×CRISIS -0.005 -0.032 0.153 0.252** 
 (0.098) (0.108) (0.102) (0.111) 
NPLt-1 -0.397*** -0.591*** -0.494*** -0.644*** 
 (0.037) (0.041) (0.053) (0.055) 
NPLt-1×CRISIS -0.098** -0.145*** 0.090 0.031 
 (0.043) (0.049) (0.059) (0.062) 
△GDPt-1 0.022 0.077* 0.016 0.028 
 (0.039) (0.044) (0.036) (0.041) 
△MPt-1 -0.202*** 0.120 -0.208*** -0.110 
 (0.075) (0.083) (0.080) (0.083) 
CRISIS 0.074 0.440*** 0.030 -0.110 
 (0.164) (0.170) (0.211) (0.214) 
Constant -0.393 0.028 -0.380 0.146 
 (0.308) (0.321) (0.310) (0.321) 
     
Bank dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Quarter dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 31,500 31,500 31,500 31,500 
Number of banks 1,050 1,050 1,050 1,050 
Adjusted R-squared 0.154 0.118 0.156 0.119 
 
Note: This table reports fixed effects regression results with crisis dummy interactions, where crisis dummy 
takes the value of 1 for the period from 2007q3 to 2009q2 in Eq (1)-(2) and from 2007q3 to 2010q4 in Eq (3)-(4) 
and 0 elsewhere, respectively. The sample period goes from 2003q1 to 2010q4. For the capital ratio variable 
(CAPt-1), only total risk-based capital ratio is used. Capital ratio is normalized to the minimum regulatory 
requirement, 8%. All other bank-specific characteristic variables are normalized to their mean values. All the 
regressions include quarterly dummies to control for seasonal influences. Robust standard errors, clustered at the 
bank-level, are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively.  
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Table 7. Interaction effect of capital and liquidity 
Dependent variable LOANt CREDITt 
Definition of CAP Total risk-
based ratio 
Tier 1 risk-
based ratio 
Leverage 
ratio 
Total risk-
based ratio 
Tier 1 risk-
based ratio 
Leverage 
ratio 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
LOAN(CREDIT)t-1  0.089*** 0.089*** 0.083*** 0.059*** 0.059*** 0.057*** 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
CAPt-1 0.143*** 0.155*** 0.100* 0.054* 0.069** 0.071 
 (0.028) (0.029) (0.052) (0.032) (0.032) (0.061) 
LIQt-1 0.103*** 0.100*** 0.108*** 0.050*** 0.042** 0.059*** 
 (0.016) (0.020) (0.018) (0.015) (0.019) (0.019) 
CAPt-1×LIQt-1 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.003* 0.003* 0.005 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
SIZEt-1 -3.649*** -3.618*** -3.791*** -4.766*** -4.736*** -4.754*** 
 (0.273) (0.274) (0.271) (0.300) (0.302) (0.300) 
MFUNDt-1 0.028** 0.029** 0.028** 0.004 0.005 0.007 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
COMMITt-1 0.280*** 0.280*** 0.273*** -0.134*** -0.133*** -0.134*** 
 (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.023) (0.023) (0.022) 
ROAt-1 0.122** 0.118* 0.143** 0.332*** 0.328*** 0.333*** 
 (0.062) (0.062) (0.065) (0.077) (0.077) (0.078) 
NPLt-1 -0.418*** -0.417*** -0.409*** -0.624*** -0.624*** -0.622*** 
 (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.038) (0.038) (0.037) 
△GDPt-1 -0.000 0.001 -0.003 0.010 0.011 0.011 
 (0.036) (0.036) (0.037) (0.041) (0.041) (0.042) 
△MPt-1 -0.379*** -0.376*** -0.367*** -0.234*** -0.233*** -0.224*** 
 (0.064) (0.064) (0.063) (0.068) (0.068) (0.067) 
Constant -0.320 -0.865** 0.355 0.266 -0.054 0.402 
 (0.281) (0.364) (0.337) (0.303) (0.397) (0.391) 
       
Bank dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Quarter dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 31,500 31,500 31,500 31,500 31,500 31,500 
Number of banks 1,050 1,050 1,050 1,050 1,050 1,050 
Adjusted R-squared 0.154 0.154 0.151 0.116 0.117 0.115 
 
Note: This table reports fixed effects regression results including an interaction term of capital ratio and 
liquidity ratio. The sample period goes from 2003q1 to 2010q4. For the capital ratio variable (CAPt-1), all three 
types of regulatory capital ratios are used, respectively. Capital ratios are normalized to their minimum 
regulatory requirements. All other bank-specific characteristic variables are normalized to their mean values. All 
the regressions include quarterly dummies to control for seasonal influences. Robust standard errors, clustered at 
the bank-level, are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
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Table 8. Interaction effect of capital and liquidity with crisis interactions 
Dependent variable LOANt CREDITt 
Definition of CAP Total risk-
based ratio 
Tier 1 risk-
based ratio 
Leverage 
ratio 
Total risk-
based ratio 
Tier 1 risk-
based ratio 
Leverage 
ratio 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
LOAN(CREDIT)t-1 0.087*** 0.087*** 0.082*** 0.057*** 0.057*** 0.055*** 
 (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) 
CAPt-1 0.115*** 0.125*** 0.050 0.035 0.047 0.060 
 (0.030) (0.030) (0.059) (0.034) (0.034) (0.069) 
CAPt-1×CRISIS 0.050** 0.053*** 0.066** 0.051** 0.058*** 0.050 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.033) (0.020) (0.020) (0.035) 
LIQt-1 0.088*** 0.081*** 0.095*** 0.034** 0.024 0.053** 
 (0.016) (0.021) (0.021) (0.016) (0.020) (0.022) 
LIQt-1×CRISIS 0.026** 0.029** 0.023 0.021* 0.023 0.004 
 (0.012) (0.014) (0.018) (0.012) (0.014) (0.018) 
CAPt-1×LIQt-1 0.002 0.002 0.004 0.004** 0.004** 0.004 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) 
CAPt-1×LIQt-1×CRISIS -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 0.003 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) 
SIZEt-1 -4.085*** -4.042*** -4.360*** -4.941*** -4.887*** -4.951*** 
 (0.354) (0.355) (0.362) (0.392) (0.393) (0.398) 
SIZEt-1×CRISIS 0.050 0.055 0.065 -0.067 -0.061 -0.078 
 (0.081) (0.081) (0.078) (0.085) (0.085) (0.082) 
MFUNDt-1 0.027* 0.027* 0.027* 0.002 0.002 0.005 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) 
MFUNDt-1×CRISIS 0.009 0.010 0.008 0.010 0.010 0.009 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
COMMITt-1 0.277*** 0.277*** 0.271*** -0.135*** -0.134*** -0.135*** 
 (0.028) (0.028) (0.027) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) 
COMMITt-1×CRISIS 0.011** 0.011** 0.011** -0.010** -0.009** -0.010** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
ROAt-1 0.069 0.068 0.082 0.209** 0.207** 0.192** 
 (0.086) (0.086) (0.090) (0.093) (0.093) (0.094) 
ROAt-1×CRISIS 0.147 0.139 0.175* 0.247** 0.238** 0.281** 
 (0.103) (0.102) (0.105) (0.113) (0.113) (0.112) 
NPLt-1 -0.490*** -0.488*** -0.483*** -0.638*** -0.638*** -0.639*** 
 (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (0.055) (0.055) (0.055) 
NPLt-1×CRISIS 0.087 0.087 0.087 0.028 0.028 0.033 
 (0.058) (0.058) (0.059) (0.062) (0.062) (0.063) 
△GDPt-1 0.016 0.018 0.010 0.028 0.030 0.028 
 (0.036) (0.036) (0.038) (0.041) (0.041) (0.043) 
△MPt-1 -0.203** -0.203** -0.160** -0.095 -0.098 -0.078 
 (0.079) (0.079) (0.079) (0.083) (0.083) (0.082) 
CRISIS 0.017 -0.165 0.077 -0.117 -0.350 -0.026 
 (0.214) (0.267) (0.242) (0.217) (0.270) (0.252) 
Constant -0.312 -0.757** 0.429 0.275 0.041 0.358 
 (0.293) (0.378) (0.375) (0.313) (0.411) (0.425) 
       
Bank dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 31,500 31,500 31,500 31,500 31,500 31,500 
Number of banks 1,050 1,050 1,050 1,050 1,050 1,050 
Adjusted R-squared 0.156 0.156 0.153 0.119 0.120 0.118 
 
Note: This table reports fixed effects regression results with crisis dummy interactions, where crisis dummy 
takes the value of 1 for the period from 2007q3 to 2010q4 and 0 elsewhere. The sample period goes from 
2003q1 to 2010q4. For the capital ratio variable (CAPt-1), all three types of regulatory capital ratios are used, 
respectively. Capital ratios are normalized to their minimum regulatory requirements. All other bank-specific 
characteristic variables are normalized to their mean values. All the regressions include quarterly dummies to 
control for seasonal influences. Robust standard errors, clustered at the bank-level, are reported in parentheses. 
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 10. Robustness checks 
 All banks Large banks 
Definition of CAP Total risk-
based ratio 
Tier 1 risk-
based ratio 
Leverage 
ratio 
Total risk-
based ratio 
Tier 1 risk-
based ratio 
Leverage 
ratio 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
CREDITt-1  0.058*** 0.058*** 0.055*** 0.060 0.061 0.058 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.044) (0.043) (0.043) 
CAPt-1 0.094* 0.108** 0.094 0.028 0.011 -0.008 
 (0.050) (0.051) (0.093) (0.167) (0.169) (0.248) 
LIQt-1 0.077*** 0.067*** 0.086*** -0.010 -0.059 -0.068 
 (0.016) (0.020) (0.021) (0.049) (0.061) (0.069) 
CAPt-1×LIQt-1 0.003* 0.003* 0.005 0.007 0.012** 0.026* 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.014) 
SIZEt-1 -6.355*** -6.292*** -6.421*** -7.632*** -7.785*** -7.346*** 
 (0.690) (0.693) (0.687) (1.277) (1.326) (1.252) 
MFUNDt-1 -0.002 -0.002 -0.000 0.056 0.055 0.059 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.061) (0.061) (0.064) 
COMMITt-1 -0.204*** -0.204*** -0.205*** -0.094** -0.096** -0.093** 
 (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.042) (0.041) (0.043) 
ROAt-1 0.213** 0.208* 0.220** 1.079** 1.102** 1.075** 
 (0.108) (0.107) (0.111) (0.477) (0.475) (0.450) 
NPLt-1 -0.696*** -0.696*** -0.684*** -1.348*** -1.343*** -1.332*** 
 (0.052) (0.052) (0.050) (0.287) (0.291) (0.288) 
Constant -1.431*** -1.852*** -1.103** 26.130*** 26.672*** 25.430*** 
 (0.393) (0.533) (0.507) (4.458) (4.931) (4.384) 
       
Bank dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Quarter dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 23,100 23,100 23,100 1,232 1,232 1,232 
Number of banks 1,050 1,050 1,050 56 56 56 
Adjusted R-squared 0.083 0.083 0.081 0.100 0.101 0.102 
 
Note: This table reports fixed effects regression results excluding the period after TARP capital injections. Thus, 
the sample period goes from 2003q1 to 2008q4. The dependent variable is the quarterly growth rate of credit. 
For the capital ratio variable (CAPt-1), all three types of regulatory capital ratios are used, respectively. Capital 
ratios are normalized to their minimum regulatory requirements. All other bank-specific characteristic variables 
are normalized to their mean values. All the regressions include quarterly dummies to control for seasonal 
influences. Robust standard errors, clustered at the bank-level, are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
